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BLURRING THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN
IMMIGRATION AND CRIME CONTROL
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11TH
Teresa A. Miller*
Abstract: Although the escalating criminalization of immigration law
has been examined at length, the social control dimension of this
phenomenon has gone relatively understudied. This Article attempts to
remedy this deªciency by tracing the relationship between criminal
punishment and immigration law, demonstrating that the War on
Terror has further blurred these distinctions and exposing the social
control function that pervades immigration law enforcement after
September 11th prioritized counterterrorism. In doing so, the author
draws upon the work of Daniel Kanstroom, Michael Welch, Jonathan
Simon and Malcolm Feeley.
Introduction
The formal legal distinction between criminal punishment and
civil regulation remains quite salient after the events of September 11,
2001, as does the distinction between citizens and noncitizens. In com-
bination, however, these distinctions differentiate between the punish-
ment of criminal offenders with the status and privileges of U.S. citizen-
ship and those without. The line dividing citizens and noncitizens thus
justiªes the radically different treatment of criminal offenders and so-
called criminal aliens under the law. Where these lines are drawn
within immigration law and policy profoundly affects the manner in
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which the U.S. government may legally combat terrorism.1 However,
these lines did not wholly emerge—as one might suspect—from immi-
gration laws passed by Congress in a ºurry of lawmaking after 9/11. To
the contrary, immigration legislation passed years before the attacks,
embraced the criminal justice system’s severe treatment of drug of-
fenders and the poor. As the criminal justice system created punish-
ments that “got tough” on all convicted drug offenders,2 immigration
law adopted harsh consequences for convicted noncitizen drug offend-
ers.3 Under immigration reforms enacted in 1996, these so-called
“criminal aliens” could be detained and deported—often retroac-
tively—and denied relief from either, regardless of particular mitigating
circumstances.4 And because courts characterized these harsh measures
                                                                                                                     
1 See Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-
September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 639, 660, 661 (2004) (asserting
that traditional distinctions between citizens and noncitizens, as well as between civil regu-
lation and criminal law enforcement are increasingly inadequate to account for post-
September 11 law enforcement, and that “slippage” between the categories greatly ex-
pands federal law enforcement authority and subjects millions of noncitizens, especially
undocumented workers, to criminal punishment) [hereinafter Kanstroom, Criminalizing
the Undocumented]. This Article analyzes post-September 11 line-drawing as well, but focuses
on the effect of citizen/noncitizen and civil/criminal lines on criminal aliens. In contrast
to Kanstroom’s study of the criminalization of the undocumented, this Article examines
how criminals—traditionally criminal aliens, but now illegal aliens as well—are being
“managed” through the blurring of distinctions between aliens, criminals and terrorists.
2 See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 § 1002, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2000) (establishing
drug quantity-based mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes); Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3586 (2000) (reducing judicial discretion in the sentencing
process); Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (ADAA), Pub. L. No 100–690, §§ 7342–
7349, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469–73 (1988) (codiªed as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.) (authorizing the eviction of public housing tenants and their household members
and guests who have been arrested for engaging in drug-related or other criminal activity).
3 See, e.g., Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT), Pub. L. No. 101–649, § 501, 104 Stat.
4978, 5048 (codiªed as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) § 441, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2000); Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) § 303, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2000);
ADAA §§ 7342–7349.
4 Before 1996, a number of mitigating circumstances were available to “criminal ali-
ens.” Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1), (2) (1994),
repealed by IIRIRA § 304, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2000) (allowing aliens to apply for suspension of
deportation by demonstrating that deportation would result in “extreme hardship”); INA
§ 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (1994), amended by IIRIRA § 348, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2000)
(allowing certain aliens who have been convicted of crimes of moral turpitude to waive
deportation by showing “extreme hardship”); INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (2000),
repealed by IIRIRA § 304, 8 U.S.C. 1226 (2000) (demonstrating social and humane consid-
erations such as family ties allowed for waiver of deportation). The foundational immigra-
tion cases deªning deportation as regulatory, and thereby distinguishing deportation from
punishment include Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 670 (1893); Chae Chan
Ping v. United States (the Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 605–06 (1889); and
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as regulatory rather than punitive, the U.S. Constitution did not stand
in their way.5
In the years between 1996 and 2001, the immigration system
bought into the “severity revolution” occurring within the criminal jus-
tice system.6 Some describe it as the “criminalization” of immigration
law,7 whereas others describe it as a convergence between the criminal
justice and deportation systems.8 Under either characterization, the
interaction of the two systems produced outcomes that were unprece-
dented, and even unintentional at times, in their harshness. For exam-
ple, criminal sentencing enhancements for past offenses coalesced with
immigration law’s enhanced “aggravated felony” designation to man-
                                                                                                                     
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594–95 (1952). See generally Mary M. Cheh, Consti-
tutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies To Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and
Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 Hastings L.J. 1325, 1343–44 (1991)
(“The Court has approved such regulatory measures as . . . detention of resident aliens
pending deportation proceedings.”)
5 See United States v. Yacoubian, 24 F.3d 1, 10 (9th Cir. 1994) (dismissing an ex post
facto challenge to deportation because the ex post facto clause is only applicable to
“criminal laws”); Fayemi v. Bureau of Immigration and Custom Enforcement, No. CV-04-
1935, 2004 WL 1161532, at *1–2, 4 (E.D.N.Y. May 24, 2004) (dismissing Eighth Amend-
ment challenge to deportation of Nigerian national with aggravated felony conviction on
the basis that deportation is not punishment, but a civil, regulatory procedure); Lovell v.
INS, No. 01 CV 2295, 2003 WL 22282176, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 21, 2003) (dismissing Eighth
Amendment challenge to denial of relief from removal on the basis that deportation is not
punishment); Saaka v. Reno, No. 95C 3297, 1995 WL 765281, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 26,
1995) (dismissing double jeopardy and ex post facto clause challenges to deportation and
detention of aggravated felon on the ground that deportation is not punishment).
6 See Jonathan Simon, Sanctioning Government: Explaining America’s Severity Revolution, 56
U. Miami L. Rev. 217, 218–19 (2001). The severity revolution is a term coined by law pro-
fessor Joseph Kennedy to describe a dramatic break in the mid-1970s with a relatively sta-
ble set of values and objectives that had endured within the ªeld of criminal punishment
for two centuries. Id. In contrast to the values of the “humanity revolution,” the continuing
severity revolution “openly espouse[s] severity of punishment as an overarching good” and
“abandon[s] the long tradition of minimizing pain and cruelty in the penal process”; it has
produced incarceration rates “roughly ªve times their norm for the ªrst three quarters of
the twentieth century, and more than three times the next closest level among advanced
liberal societies.” Id. at 219.
7 See, e.g., Laura S. Adams, Divergence and the Dynamic Relationship Between Domestic and
Immigration Law and International Human Rights, 51 Emory L.J. 983, 983 (2002); Bill Ong
Hing, The Immigrant as Criminal: Punishing Dreamers, 9 Hastings Women’s L.J. 79, 80–81
(1998); Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions and
Marriage Fraud, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 669, 671 (1997); Helen Morris, Zero Tolerance: The
Increasing Criminalization of Immigration Law, 74 Interpreter Releases 1317, 1317 (Aug.
29, 1997).
8 See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control and Punishment: Some Thoughts
About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1889, 1891 (2000) [hereinafter
Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment].
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date the incarceration9 and removal10 of noncitizens with mere misde-
meanor convictions on their criminal records.11 These outcomes aided
the advance of not only the crime control agenda of the War on Drugs,
but the social reform agenda of retrenching the welfare state as well.12
The most signiªcant immigration reforms enacted by Congress
during this era dramatically enhanced collateral civil penalties pertain-
ing to noncitizens. Two major immigration laws enacted in 1996—the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Ille-
gal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)—
subjected both noncitizens convicted of crimes and those with past
criminal convictions to mandatory detention and deportation without
the avenues of relief traditionally available to detainable and deport-
able aliens.13
Prior to these reforms, only certain serious felony convictions sub-
jected noncitizens to detention and deportation, such as murder, drug
and ªrearms trafªcking.14 The 1996 legislation, however, greatly ex-
panded the litany of crimes subjecting foreigners to detention and de-
                                                                                                                     
9 Detention no longer does justice to the circumstances or conditions of conªnement,
so I use the word incarceration interchangeably.
10 This Article uses the terms “deportation” and “removal” interchangeably. The 1996
immigration legislation introduces the term “removal,” but “removal” does not convey the
experience of what is effectively banishment with no prospect of legal reentry for an ex-
tended period of time.
11 See ADAA § 7342, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (Supp. 1990) (deªning “aggravated felon”
to include crimes such as murder and drug trafªcking); IMMACT § 501, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43) (1994) (amending the deªnition of “aggravated felon” to include violent
offences that could impose a ªve-year penalty); IIRIRA § 321, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)
(2000) (lowering the amount of time an alien needed to be potentially penalized before
circumstances or conditions of conªnement, so I use the word incarceration inter-
changeably.the violent crime constituted an “aggravated felony” to one year). Because
some states will give a one-year sentence for a misdemeanor, these crimes are now elevated
to felonies for immigration purposes. See, e.g., Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727, 736–37
(7th Cir.), reh’g denied, 256 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2001) (ªnding misdemeanor offense for sex-
ual abuse of minor an aggravated felony in Illinois); Matter of Small, 23 I. & N. Dec. 448
(B.I.A. 2002) (conviction of misdemeanor sexual abuse can be considered an aggravated
felony). See generally Dawn Marie Johnson, AEDPA and the IIRIRA: Treating Misdemeanors as
Felonies for Immigration Purposes, 27 J. Legis. 477 (2001) [hereinafter Johnson, AEDPA and
the IIRIRA].
12 See generally Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the
New Penology, 17 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 611 (2003).
13 See AEDPA § 441(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000); IIRIRA §§ 303, 304, 321, 348, 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101(a), 1182(h), 1226 (2000).
14 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1994). Although immigration law has long provided for the
deportation of criminal aliens committing particularly serious crimes like murder, drug
trafªcking, and ªrearms trafªcking, the range of deportable crimes has expanded expo-
nentially in the last twenty years. See supra note 11.
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portation.15 Today, a single misdemeanor conviction of one year or
more for a crime as minor as shoplifting subjects a non-U.S. citizen to
detention and deportation.16 This expansion of the types of crimes
mandating detention and deportation applied to all categories of non-
citizens, including lawful permanent residents (“LPRs” or “green card
holders”), long privileged as aliens on the “fast track” to citizenship.17 It
also applied retroactively, so that noncitizens convicted of crimes that
would not have rendered them deportable before 1996 suddenly faced
deportation after Congress passed AEDPA and IIRIRA.18
Thus, by the time of the tragic events of September 11, 2001,
immigration law had already enhanced the collateral civil penalties to
noncitizens convicted of crimes in the United States.19 The nation’s
swift response to terrorism capitalized on immigration law’s utility as a
mechanism for crime control and social control to confront the “hy-
percrime” of terrorism. Indeed, the scope of the War on Terror has
expanded to encompass the incarceration and removal of noncitizens
who have committed unrelated criminal offenses.
For example, in July 2003, the newly formed Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) initiated “Operation Predator” to appre-
hend and purge noncitizens with past sex offenses from the nation’s
                                                                                                                     
15 See AEDPA § 441(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000) (expanding the “aggravated felony”
deªnition to include gambling, alien smuggling, and passport fraud); IIRIRA § 321, 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000) (adding crimes such as rape and sexual abuse of a minor, as
well as lowering sentence requirements of violent crimes to one year to be deportable).
16 Kati L. Grifªth, Perfecting Public Immigration Legislation: Private Immigration Bills and
Deportable Lawful Permanent Residents, 18 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 273, 276 (2004) (“Since 1996,
even if an LPR has lived in the United States since childhood, she can be subject to man-
datory deportation for almost any criminal conviction—including misdemeanors, such as
shoplifting or a bar ªght.”); Johnson, AEDPA and the IIRIRA, supra note 11, at 477.
17 See Serena Hoy, The Other Detainees, Legal Aff. 58 (Oct. 2004).
18 See AEDPA § 441(e), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a) (2000); IIRIRA § 321(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)
(2000). The original approach of the IIRIRA was even harsher, retroactively subjecting
noncitizens convicted either by a plea bargain or a verdict pre-dating the legislation to
mandatory detention and deportation. See IIRIRA § 321(b), 8 U.S.C. § 321(b) (2000).
However, the Supreme Court intervened by limiting retroactivity to guilty verdicts rather
than plea bargains. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001). See generally Daniel Kanstroom,
St. Cyr or Insincere: The Strange Quality of Supreme Court Victory, 16 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 413
(2002).
19 Civil collateral penalties are disabilities and ineligibilities that inhere to a convicted
felon not as part of the formal sentence, but as a result of holding the status of “convicted
felon,” thus supplementing the criminal conviction. Such penalties have been adopted in a
variety of regulatory domains, including housing law, voting law, family law, and employment
law. See generally Civil Penalties, Social Consequences (Christopher Mele & Teresa Miller
eds., 2005).
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borders.20 According to Michael Garcia, the Assistant Secretary for Im-
migration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), taking these ex-offenders
off the streets pursuant to this operation helped to safeguard America,
one broad mission of the Department of Homeland Security.21 He indi-
cated further that pooling government resources under the umbrella
of Homeland Security aided the frequency and accuracy of these de-
tentions.22 Pursuant to this program, ICE—fashioned from the investi-
gative and intelligence arms of the former INS and the U.S. Customs
Service, as well as the Federal Protective Service and the Federal Air
Marshal Service—had arrested approximately 6,000 fugitives by March
of 2004.23 In analyzing legal line drawing after 9/11, it is more accurate
to say that the preexisting distinctions setting “criminal aliens” apart
from ordinary criminal offenders—lines drawn principally in efforts to
achieve welfare and drug enforcement reform—gained renewed utility
and signiªcance after September 11, 2001.
Part I of this Article surveys several major developments in immi-
gration law and policy since 9/11 that underlie the merger of the
criminal and immigration systems. Part II examines three major theo-
retical responses to this ongoing merger. Finally, Part III illustrates how
the “new penology” blurs distinctions between illegal aliens, criminal
aliens, and terrorists.
I. The Domestic Legal Response to the 9/11 Attacks
In the months and years following September 11, 2001, much of
the domestic response to the terror attacks was a legal one. Broad
counterterrorism legislation, such as the USA PATRIOT Act,24 the
Homeland Security Act (HSA),25 and the Enhanced Border Security
                                                                                                                     
20 Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Secretary Ridge Announces “Opera-
tion Predator Initiative” ( July 9, 2003), at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=
1069. Sex offenders became the object of harsh penal treatment during the “severity revolu-
tion” in crime control that “got tough” on criminals and rationalized the harsh treatment of
drug offenders as well during the War on Drugs. See Simon, supra note 6, at 229, 233.
21 See generally Statement of Michael J. Garcia, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security Before the House Comm. on Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Immigration, Border Security and Claims, 108th Cong. (2004), available at http://www.ice.gov/
graphics/news/testimonies/oppredator_030404.pdf.
22 See id. at 4-5.
23 See id. at 14.
24 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to In-
tercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) (codiªed as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C).
25 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA), Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 442, 451, 6 U.S.C.
§§ 252, 271 (2002).
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and Visa Entry Reform Act (EBSVERA)26 were passed to expand the
exclusion, detention, and surveillance of noncitizens who could
threaten national security, as well as to increase the ºow of intelligence
on these individuals across governmental agencies. To supplement
these measures, presidential directives were issued, regulations prom-
ulgated, and policy initiatives undertaken to strengthen national secu-
rity through stricter enforcement of immigration laws and greater co-
ordination of governmental resources. Several such policies illustrate
the accelerating criminalization of the immigration system.
A. Zero-Tolerance Immigration Law Enforcement
In response to the attacks, immigration ofªcials and criminal law en-
forcement authorities took a zero-tolerance approach to non-compliance
with immigration laws that disproportionately punished immigrant com-
munities, targeting them for tough law enforcement measures only indi-
rectly related to counterterrorism efforts. Zero-tolerance was a promi-
nent aspect of pre-9/11 reforms that used immigration law as a tool of
criminal law enforcement—particularly drug enforcement.27 After the
attacks, however, zero-tolerance enforcement of immigration law was ex-
tended to non-U.S. citizens who did not bear the taint of having been
processed by the criminal justice system, such as asylum seekers and un-
documented aliens.
1. Absconder Apprehension Initiative
Only three months after the attacks, the U.S. government re-
sponded to terrorism by prioritizing coordination between immigra-
tion and criminal law enforcement ofªcials, as well as by demanding
strict compliance with civil immigration orders. In January of 2002,
Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson announced a new initiative
to “locate, apprehend, interview, and deport” approximately 314,000
noncitizens who had been ordered deported, but had failed to comply
with their deportation orders.28 Referring to these individuals as ab-
sconders, the Department of Justice (DOJ) focused on 6,000 of the es-
timated 314,000 total “absconder” population that came to the United
States from countries “in which there ha[d] been Al Qaeda terrorist
                                                                                                                     
26 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (EBSVERA), Pub. L.
No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 553, §§ 201–203, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1721–1723 (2002).
27 Morris, supra note 7, at 1322.
28 Dan Eggen, Deportee Sweep Will Start With Mideast Focus, Wash. Post, Feb. 8, 2002, at
A1 (discussing the Justice Department’s Absconder Apprehension Initiative).
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presence or activity.”29 In an internal memo dated January 25, 2002, to
the INS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Marshals
Service, and U.S. Attorneys, Deputy Attorney General Thompson di-
rected federal law enforcement agencies like the FBI and the U.S. Mar-
shals Service to focus their efforts on apprehending these so-called
“priority absconders”.30 According to the memo, once apprehended,
priority absconders would be interviewed by teams of immigration and
federal law enforcement agents about their knowledge of terrorism,
and then either criminally prosecuted for failing to depart or reenter-
ing illegally after removal, or deported pursuant to the existing removal
order.31 Although the Absconder Apprehension Initiative was criticized
roundly for involving local law enforcement ofªcials in the enforce-
ment of civil deportation orders and for singling out entire communi-
ties of individuals of Arab descent as potential terrorists,32 it jointly and
effectively deployed crime and immigration control resources and led
to the apprehension of 1,139 fugitives by May of 2003.33
2. Enforcement of Address Change Reporting
In July, 2002, the DOJ announced its intention to begin strictly en-
forcing § 265 of the Immigration and Nationality Act34—an obscure
immigration law virtually ignored by immigration ofªcials since 1952—
which requires all noncitizens, whether in the country legally or ille-
gally, to report address changes within ten days of changing their resi-
dence.35 Most non-U.S. citizens, particularly longtime permanent resi-
                                                                                                                     
29 Deputy Attorney General Releases Internal Guidance for ‘Absconder’ Apprehensions, 79 In-
terpreter Releases 261, 261 (Feb. 18, 2002).
30 Id. Law enforcement ofªcials distilled a list of priority absconders to less than 1000,
suspected of being convicted felons, who would be targeted ªrst. Id.
31 Id.
32 See, e.g., Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences
of Racial Proªling after September 11, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 1185, 1193 (2002) (asserting that the
Alien Absconder Initiative had “not resulted in any apparent progress in the war on terror-
ism. However, the DOJ, working on less-than-credible tips, has effectively disrupted indi-
vidual lives, families, and communities”).
33 The War on Terrorism: Immigration Enforcement Since September 11, 2001: Hearing Before the
House Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
108th Cong. 14 (2003) (statement of William T. Dougherty, Director of Operations, ICE).
34 INA § 265, 8 U.S.C. § 1305 (1052), 8 C.F.R. § 265.1 (2004) (requiring all noncitizens
remaining in the United States thirty days or more to report each change of address and
new address to the USCIS within ten days on Form AR-11); see Daniel Kanstroom, Deporta-
tion and Justice: A Constitutional Dialogue, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 771, 777 n.33 (2000) [hereinafter
Kanstroom, Deportation and Justice: A Constitutional Dialogue].
35 Jonathan Peterson, Noncitizens Must Report If They Move, L.A. Times, July 23, 2002,
at.A1.
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dents who have likely moved numerous times over their extended resi-
dence, know nothing of the requirement since the rule had never been
enforced prior to the 9/11 attacks.36 Aliens who entered the United
States illegally are likewise unlikely to divulge their whereabouts to the
agency charged with apprehending and deporting them. Moreover, it
seems unlikely that terrorists operating surreptitiously within the
United States will comply with the rule. Even when aliens do comply
with the reporting requirement, a dismal record of bureaucratic
inefªciency and misplacement of documents cast doubt on the ability
of the old INS—or the new U.S. Customs and Immigration Service
(USCIS)—to process the forms.37 Nevertheless, the newly strict en-
forcement of ªling requirements is consistent with the government’s
interior counterterrorism strategy of tracking more closely the move-
ments of aliens, thus blurring distinctions between criminal and non-
criminal aliens.38
B. Immigration Detention
In addition to strictly enforcing immigration regulations, the U.S.
government has used both immigration detention and the threat of it
against non-U.S. citizens to conduct its criminal investigation of the
attacks. Indeed, zero-tolerance policing of immigration violations has
led to numerous detentions of noncitizens as a direct result of the
                                                                                                                     
36 See Peterson, supra note 35. Following the announcement, a number of organizations
commented. See Memorandum from the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights
(ICIRR) to the INS (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.ilrc.org/la/INS_address_change_
comments1.doc; Memorandum from the National Asian Paciªc American Legal Consortium
to INS, (Aug. 26, 2002), available at http://www.napalc.org/ªles/Comments_67_Fed_Reg.
pdf.
37 See Alex Gourevitch, Alien Nation: The Justice Department Takes on Immigrants, Er, Terrorists,
13 Am. Prospect 15, 16 (2003). Within six weeks of the Justice Department’s announcement
of its August 2002 policy change, the INS received 870,000 registration forms, compared to
the 2,800 forms received in the preceding month. See Gourevitch, supra, at 15. Indeed, the
U.S. General Accounting Ofªce found that the INS lacked adequate processing procedures
and controls to ensure that the alien address information received was complete integrated
into automated databases. General Accounting Ofªce, Report to Congressional Re-
questers, Homeland Security: INS Cannot Locate Many Aliens Because It Lacks
Reliable Address Information 6–8 (2002), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.88&ªlename=d03188.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/
data/gao.
38 See 8 C.F.R. § 265.1 (2004); see also Kevin Johnson & Laura Parker, Ashcroft Plan to
Track Aliens Hits Snag; Change-of-Address Cards Overwhelm INS, USA Today, Sept. 6, 2002, at
A1 (quoting a Justice Department spokesman as saying, “The [change of address] rule is
essential for keeping track of aliens who might—I stress might—pose a national security
risk.”).
90 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 25:81
heightened penalties for immigration violations, including mandatory
detention, enacted in the decade prior to the attacks.39
Immediately after the terrorist attacks, the Department of Justice
detained noncitizens who were either suspected of having connections
to the attacks or ties to terrorism pursuant to the FBI’s investigation of
the attacks.40 Rather than arrest Arab and Muslim men as criminal sus-
pects, law enforcement agents utilized the greater latitude and reduced
accountability under federal immigration law to immobilize Arab and
Muslim communities.41 Once individuals were detained, federal law
enforcement ofªcials could interrogate them as part of a criminal in-
vestigation, while checking their compliance with immigration regula-
tions.42 In the eleven months after the attacks, 762 aliens were detained
pursuant to the FBI terrorism investigation for various immigration of-
fenses, including overstaying of visas and illegally entering the coun-
try.43 The government claimed that further acts of terrorism could be
prevented if terrorists and terrorist sympathizers were incapacitated,
which rationalized the massive round-up of Arab and Muslim foreign
nationals.44
                                                                                                                     
39 See Morris, supra note 7, at 1317. Mandatory detention was enacted by both ADAA
and the IIRIRA. ADAA § 1751, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2000); IIRIRA § 303, 8 U.S.C. § 1226
(2000).
40 This mission was code-named “PENTTBOM,” for Pentagon Twin Towers Bombing.
Ofªce of the Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The September 11 Detainees: A Re-
view of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the
September 11 Attacks 17 (2003) (citing that the FBI in New York City should have made more of
an effort to distinguish between aliens legitimately suspected under the PENTTBOM investi-
gation and those who were not under suspicion), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/
special/0306/full.pdf [hereinafter The September 11 Detainees]; see David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54
Stan. L. Rev. 953, 960–61 (2002).
41 See Immigrant Rights Clinic, Indeªnite Detention Without Probable Cause: A Comment on
INS Interim Rule 8 C.F.R. § 287.3, 26 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 397, 397 (2001) (com-
menting on use of law enforcement in immigration investigation).
42 See Seth Stern, Lawyers See Potential Abuse of Visa Laws to Hold Suspected Terrorists,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 18, 2001, at 18.
43 Press Release, Department of Justice, Inspector General Issues Report on Treatment of
Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September
11 Terrorist Attacks ( June 2, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/igspecr1.htm.
44 Oversight Hearing: Lessons Learned—The Inspector General’s Report on the 9/11 Detainees:
Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. ¶¶ 15, 19 ( June 25, 2003),
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=817&wit_id_2316 (testimony of
Michael Rolince, Assistant Director in Charge, Washington Field Ofªce, Federal Bureau of
Investigations). Assistant Director Rolince stated:
As this massive investigation unfolded, the concern of follow-on attacks was
critical to our thinking and to our development of an investigative strategy.
. . . [T]he Department of Justice, in conjunction with the FBI, determined
that the best course of action to protect national security was to remove po-
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Immediately after the attacks, and lacking express legal authority
to detain terrorism suspects preventively, Attorney General John Ash-
croft revised INS detention rules to expand the government’s power to
detain aliens.45 The new rules doubled—from twenty-four to forty-eight
hours—the time allotted to the INS to either release detained immi-
grants or charge them with a crime or visa violation.46 Moreover, if the
agency can claim emergency or extraordinary circumstances, the forty-
eight-hour deadline is waived, and the alien can be held for an addi-
tional “reasonable period of time” without charges.47
C. Closer Cooperation with Local Law Enforcement
Federal law enforcement ofªcials have begun to work more closely
with state and local law enforcement agents to police compliance with
federal immigration laws.48 Metropolitan areas with large populations
of non-U.S. citizens—particularly illegal aliens—have traditionally op-
posed the deputizing of their police ofªcers, believing that it would
erode the trust local police seek to build over time with immigrant
communities and discourage immigrants from reporting crimes,
thereby rendering those communities less safe.49 Nonetheless, in
August of 2002, Florida became the ªrst state to deputize law enforce-
ment ofªcers to assist federal INS agents in enforcing federal immigra-
                                                                                                                     
tentially dangerous individuals from the country and ensure that they could
not return. Charges may have been withheld in such situations if, for exam-
ple, they could have compromised ongoing investigations or sensitive intelli-
gence matters.
Id.
45 Custody Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,334–35 (Sept. 20, 2001) (to be codiªed at 8
C.F.R. pt. 287) (amending INA § 287.3(d) and enacting an interim rule under APA 5
U.S.C. § 553 [foreign affairs and good cause exception to notice and comment], which
mandates only post-promulgation public comment); see Jess Bravin et al., Justice Department
Moves to Use New Authority in Detaining Aliens, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 2001, at A6; William
Glaberson, Investigators Explore Boundaries Of Everything the Law Allows, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17,
2001, at A2.
46 66 Fed. Reg. 48,334; Bravin et al., supra note 45.
47 Bravin et al., supra note 45.
48 April McKenzie, A Nation of Immigrants or a Nation of Suspects? State and Local Enforce-
ment of Federal Immigration Laws Since 9/11, 55 Ala. L. Rev. 1149, 1155–56 (2004); see also
USA PATRIOT Act § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 3796(h) (2003). But see Susan N. Herman, Our New
Federalism? National Authority and Local Autonomy in the War on Terror, 69 Brook. L. Rev.
1201, 1214–18 (2004) (citing cities that have passed ordinances banning their law en-
forcement from participating in the regulation of federal immigration laws).
49 See Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented, supra note 1, at 659–60.
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tion laws.50 Thirty-ªve ofªcers from across the state were deputized as
part of a pilot program, responding to a DOJ ªnding that local ofªcers
have “inherent authority” to enforce federal immigration laws.51 Not
long afterward, South Carolina Attorney General Charlie Condon initi-
ated a similar plan to deputize a special unit of state law enforcement
ofªcers to investigate potential immigration violations.52
A few federal lawmakers are seeking to carry these partnerships
one step further. They hope to institutionalize the growing coopera-
tion between federal, state, and local law enforcement through legis-
lation. The Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal
(CLEAR) Act, proposed by Republican representative Charlie Nor-
wood of Georgia, would explicitly conªrm the authority of local and
state law enforcement ofªcers to apprehend, arrest, detain and re-
move criminal and illegal aliens during the normal course of their
duties; provide funding to state and local law enforcement agencies
that participate in arresting undocumented immigrants; and withhold
certain funding to state and local governments that refuse to allow law
enforcement to enforce federal immigration laws.53 Although the bill
garnered 125 co-sponsors in the House, the CLEAR Act has stalled in
committee while congressional representatives debate the enormous
expense involved in implementing the Act nationwide,54 and scores of
                                                                                                                     
50INS Signs Agreement with Florida to Authorize State, Local Ofªcers to Perform Immigration
Enforcement Functions, 79 Interpreter Releases 1120, 1120 ( July 29, 2002) (citing memo-
randum of understanding stating that INA § 287(g)(1) authorizes use of local authorities
in immigration enforcement).
51 Id. at 1120. A Justice Department ruling that local ofªcers have “inherent authority”
to enforce federal immigration laws has not been publicly disclosed. Cindy Gonzalez, Im-
migration Policing Shift Gets Mixed Reviews, Omaha World-Herald, Apr. 6, 2002, at B1; Eric
Schmitt, Administration Split on Local Rule on Terror Fight, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 2002, at A1. A
current lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act seeks disclosure of the DOJ “Opin-
ion of the Ofªce of Legal Counsel” terms. See Complaint, Nat’l Council of La Raza v. De-
partment of Justice (S.D.N.Y. ªled Apr. 14, 2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/Files/
OpenFile.cfm?id=12356.
52 Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) Interior Enforcement Strategy: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claim of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. 30 (2002) (testimony of Marisa Demeo, Regional Counsel, Mexican American Legal
Defense Fund).
53 See H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2003). In addition, the proposed legislation would as-
sess ªnes on illegal aliens and permit forfeiture of their assets. Id. Companion legislation
in the form of Senate Bill 1906 was introduced in the Senate by Senators Jeff Sessions (R-
Ala.) and Zell Miller (D-Ga.), entitled “The Homeland Security Enhancement Act of
2003.” S. 1906, 108th Cong. (2003).
54 Billy House, Plan to Have Police Enforce Immigration Law Is Delayed, Ariz. Republic,
Apr. 9, 2004, at A15. The Congressional Budget Ofªce estimated that the House version of
the bill would cost federal taxpayers a hefty $9 billion over four years. Id.
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police departments, immigrant advocacy groups, mayors, and city
councils across the country speak out against the legislation.55
D. Criminalizing Asylum Seekers
Asylum seekers are foreign nationals who seek to enter the United
States based upon allegations of their persecution at the hands of the
government of the country from which they are ºeeing.56 Unlike refu-
gees, they arrive without prior State Department clearance, but are tra-
ditionally treated more sympathetically because of their claims of per-
secution.57 Since 9/11, however, this favorable treatment has ended;
their motives for seeking asylum are now suspect.58 Moreover, the mo-
tives of some no longer receive individualized scrutiny, and all “[h]igh
risk” asylum seekers are detained across the board.59 Pursuant to the
now-defunct Operation Liberty Shield, asylum applicants were auto-
matically detained if they were from thirty-four countries where al-
Qaeda or related terrorist groups operate.60 The DHS reviewed the ªles
of certain detained “Liberty Shield” asylum seekers to collect intelli-
gence on potential national security threats.61 Indeed, in 2003, BICE
interviewed 2,000 high-risk asylum seekers, resulting in only ninety-two
arrests, over 90% of which were for immigration violations.62
                                                                                                                     
55 See Rebecca McCarthy, Immigration Status Not Local Matter: Police, Others Resist U.S. Leg-
islation to Have Them Enforce Law, Atlanta J. Const., May 17, 2004, at J1.
56 INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2000).
57 INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000); see Karen C. Tumlin, Suspect
First: How Terrorism Policy Is Reshaping Immigration Policy, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 1173, 1190 (2004)
(stating that asylum seekers have traditionally been one of the most protected groups un-
der U.S. immigration policy).
58 See Secretary of Department for Homeland Security Tom Ridge, Press Brieªng on
Operation Liberty Shield ¶ 13 (Mar. 18, 2003) ( justifying detention of asylum seekers to
ensure that they are not immigrating to cause “harm or bring destruction to our shores”),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=525. There appears to be a
presumption against the validity of asylum claims. See id.
59 Nina Bernstein, Out of Repression, Into Jail, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 2004, at B1 (contrasting
blanket detention of high risk asylum seekers with prior case-by-case review); Press Release,
Department of Homeland Security, Operation Liberty Shield ¶ 9 (Mar. 17, 2003), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_release/press_release_0115.xml [hereinafter
Press Release, Operation Liberty Shield].
60 See Lori Adams, U.N. Reports Refugee Rights in the U.S. Scaled Back by Recent Anti-
terrorism Legislation: Are We Violating the United Nations Refugee Convention?, 19 N.Y.L. Sch. J.
Hum. Rts. 807, 812 (2003); see also Press Release, Operation Liberty Shield, supra note 59,
¶ 9.
61 See EOIR, BICE, Others Testify on Post-9/11 Adjudications, Closed Hearings, Special Regis-
tration, Civil Liberties, Other Issues, 80 Interpreter Releases 692, 694 (May 12, 2003).
62 Id. at 694. Only eight arrests were made on criminal charges. Id.
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The policies and initiatives discussed above are changes in immi-
gration law and policy all draw upon the objectives, techniques, and
discourses of a harshly punitive system of criminal justice to deal with
noncitizens and the terrorist threat.63 These post-9/11 reforms evi-
dence an evolving symbiosis between criminal law enforcement and
immigration regulation, continuing a process of convergence that be-
gan in the 1980s and 1990s during the crackdown on noncitizens with
criminal convictions.64 Thus, the domestic legal response to the 9/11
attacks has predictably and overwhelmingly relied upon strict enforce-
ment of immigration law and policy to address the threat of terrorism.
Possible explanations for a domestic response focusing upon im-
migration law enforcement are numerous and varied. Justiªcations fo-
cus on the immigration status of the terrorists and the efªciency of ex-
ploiting an immigration system free of constitutional restraints. The
nineteen hijackers responsible for the attacks were noncitizens, and
ªfteen had entered the United States legally on some form of tempo-
rary visa.65 Although undocumented aliens and aliens with criminal
convictions were long considered immigration “problems,” so-called
“non-immigrant” visa holders were not.66 And despite the increasingly
punitive nature of U.S. immigration policy toward criminal and un-
documented aliens, prevailing sentiment was that foreigners—par-
ticularly those lacking the intent to stay—came to the United States for
economic advancement.67 The 9/11 attacks shattered that presumption
and directed attention to stricter controls of U.S. borders to prevent
future terrorist attacks.68
Moreover, the advantages of using immigration law to contain
and expel problematic aliens were exploited in the campaign against
criminal aliens, begun in the mid-1980s. Immigration authorities em-
ployed the immigration system to apprehend, arrest, detain, and de-
                                                                                                                     
63See Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented, supra note 1, at 660; Malcolm Feeley &
Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implica-
tions, 30 Criminology 449, 449 (1992).
64 See generally Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented, supra note 1; Miller, supra
note 12.
65 Mary Beth Sheridan, Tougher Enforcement by INS Urged, Wash. Post, Sept. 18, 2001, at
A15.
66 James H. Johnson, Jr., U.S. Immigration Reform, Homeland Security, and Global Economic
Competitiveness in the Aftermath of the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks, 27 N.C. J. Int’l L. &
Com. Reg. 419, 427–28 (2002) (emphasizing that non-immigrants were admitted in in-
creasing numbers between 1981 and 1999 to contribute to economy and citing an “open
door” policy).
67 See id.
68 See Sheridan, supra note 65.
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port a wide variety of criminal aliens—non-U.S. citizens with post-
entry criminal convictions—without the need for constitutional guar-
antees of due process (including public notice and full-blown judicial
review) and free counsel for indigents that inure to aliens appre-
hended and detained through criminal law enforcement.69
In addition, the U.S. government’s deployment of immigration
law to purge “criminal” populations in the 1980s and 1990s demon-
strated both immigration law’s procedural expediency, but its substan-
tive ease as well. As law professor and immigration scholar David Mar-
tin commented shortly after the attacks, “There may not be evidence
right now to hold someone on a criminal charge, [but it is] very easy
to demonstrate a[n immigration] violation, allowing ofªcials to de-
port or detain suspects.”70
These explanations provide practical reasons for the convergence
of criminal control of terrorism and the use of immigration law to
achieve it. Less obvious, however, is each system’s use as a method of
social control, the subject of the emerging research discussed in Part II.
II. Analyzing the Merger of Crime and Immigration Control
One reason immigration and criminal law continue to converge
after September 11 is immigration law’s development as a more
efªcient mechanism for social control of noncitizens than the criminal
justice system.71 Given the signiªcance of this phenomenon, the social
control dimension of this growing intimacy was, for many years, rela-
tively understudied. Several reasons might account for this. First, the
two areas of law are doctrinally distinct. To students of criminal law,
immigration law is uncomfortably administrative. Criminal law scholars
whose bread and butter are Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment
challenges to various criminal procedures as written or applied are dis-
comªted by the lack of judicial review or constitutional lawmaking.72 To
                                                                                                                     
69 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (holding that an order
of deportation is not punishment, but a method of enforcing a type of social contract be-
tween the government and aliens residing in the country; therefore, constitutional protec-
tions such as procedural due process, the right to trial by jury and the right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishments do not apply); Teresa A. Miller, By Any Means Necessary:
Collateral Civil Penalties of Non-U.S. Citizens and the War on Terror, in Civil Penalties, Social
Consequences, supra note 19, at 48.
70 Bravin et al., supra note 45.
71 See, e.g., Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control and Punishment, supra note 8, at 1893.
72 See IIRIRA §§ 304(a), 302(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2000); INA § 242(g), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(g) (2000) (withdrawing judicial review from virtually all immigration decisions);
Melissa Cook, Note, Banished for Minor Crimes: The Aggravated Felony Provision of the Immigra-
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immigration scholars, the punitive aspects of criminal law are readily
apparent, but the constraints of plenary power and administrative law
render the broad critique of recent immigration reforms as “criminally
punitive” irrelevant to many.73
Second, the criminal justice system carries baggage that some
immigration scholars may be reluctant to bear. Even in the face of
harsh intolerance of noncitizens deemed undesirable by virtue of
poverty, race, or criminal records, many immigration scholars may
hesitate to link changes in immigration law to parallel techniques,
goals, and objectives within the criminal justice system, as doing so
could undermine the immigration system’s legitimacy.74
Third, many immigration scholars feel as many criminal punish-
ment scholars did in the late-1980s: overwhelmed with the pace of
harsh reforms and focused most immediately on documenting the
reforms before attempting to theorize them.75
Nevertheless, the work of a few scholars spanning several disci-
plines lends analytic clarity to the coercive social engineering pervad-
ing the post-9/11 legal landscape. These analyses all demonstrate that
the hybrid system of crime and immigration control created by their
convergence functions to socially control non-U.S. citizens and their
communities. Criminologists Jonathan Simon and Malcolm Feeley
identify a “new penology” that socially controls high-risk criminal sub-
jects through risk management, breaking with assumptions and prac-
                                                                                                                     
tion and Nationality Act as a Human Rights Violation, 23 B.C. Third World L.J. 293, 312
(2003) (discussing reduced judicial review).
73 See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730.
74 See Daniel Kanstroom, Crying Wolf or a Dying Canary?, 25 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change
435, 477 (1999) (arguing that a credible open immigration system is impossible while simul-
taneously sacriªcing due process ideals) [hereinafter Kanstroom, Crying Wolf or a Dying Ca-
nary?]. Many who have studied or worked within the immigration system may feel that to link
immigration reforms to the blatant racism, class bias, and overt social control facilitated by
the criminal justice system would delegitimize immigration law. See generally Marc Mauer,
Race to Incarcerate (1999); Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect: Race, Crime and Pun-
ishment in America (1995); Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime and the Law (1997); David
C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment:
Reºections on the Interaction of Fact and Perception, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 1411 (2004); Kevin
McNally, Race and the Federal Death Penalty: A Non-Existent Problem Gets Worse, 53 DePaul L. Rev.
1615 (2004); Floyd Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Proªling of African-Americans in the Selective
Enforcement of Laws: In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 721 (2004).
75 Charlotte Stichter, Homeland Security Meets Immigration: A Review of Recent Governmen-
tal Activity and Pending Legislation, 2002 Immigration Brieªngs 1 (Oct.) (noting that in
the midst of policy changes that unfolded in the months following the attacks, immigra-
tion practitioners have had to “reorient themselves to the altered legal landscape” and
“catch their collective breath”).
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tices shaping the modern, Enlightenment-inºuenced criminal justice
system over two hundred years.76 As crime and immigration control
merge, the immigration system likewise socially controls high-risk
noncitizens through actuarial and managerial processes, including
detention, surveillance, and a host of related tools operating below
the constitutional radar.77
Moreover, immigration clinician and scholar Daniel Kanstroom’s
theory of the convergence of crime control and deportation law illus-
trates how post-9/11 immigration reforms have deviated from tradi-
tional deportation justiªcations and now conform more closely to tradi-
tional justiªcations for criminal punishment.78 Kanstroom persuasively
argues that deportation—stripped of its formalistic, contract-based,
border control rationales, and examined functionally—is now a means
to continually and perpetually control the behavior of noncitizens.79
Finally, Michael Welch’s work on immigration detention and its
economic ties to the private prison industry sheds light on the entre-
preneurial aspects of immigration law after September 11.80 Welch
perceives social control functions in the nexus between the height-
ened use of detention and the economic imperatives of the private
prison industry.81 In other words, Welch sees the commodiªcation of
immigration detainees as a signiªcant manifestation of socially con-
trolling noncitizens.82 Taken together, these academics have mapped
the contours of a theory of social control that links the convergence
of immigration law and criminal punishment to the War on Terror.
A. The New Penology
Jonathan Simon and Malcolm Feeley pioneered a new understand-
ing of contemporary criminal law enforcement, procedure, and pun-
ishment that accounts for an enormous shift in institutionalized prac-
tices that, over the past three decades, produced zero-tolerance law
enforcement, draconian criminal sentences, and mass incarceration
                                                                                                                     
76 Feeley & Simon, supra note 63, at 455; Jonathan Simon, The Ideological Effects of Actu-
arial Practices, 22 Law & Soc’y Rev. 771, 773–74 (1988).
77 See discussion infra Part II.A. The new penology also explains how post-9/11 immi-
gration reforms “govern through terror” by bringing the tools of counterterrorism to bear
on problems of crime, surplus labor, and unpredictable demand for public subsidy. Id.
78 See Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment, supra note 8, at 1890–92.
79 See id. at 1911–14; discussion infra Part II.B.
80 Michael Welch, The Role of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the Prison-
Industrial Complex, 27 Soc. Just. 73, 78 (2000).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 73–74.
98 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 25:81
vastly disproportionate to the crime rate.83 These new practices break
from traditional concerns for an individual offender—his fault or guilt,
his rehabilitation, his post-conªnement reintegration into society—and
are instead concerned with identifying, classifying, and managing ag-
gregates of risk.84 In the process, concern for prevention of criminal
deviance falls by the wayside, as a certain level of criminal offending is
considered inevitable.85 The issue instead has become simply how to
manage it.86 Thus, the new penology, at its core, is managerial, actuar-
ial, and statistical—concerned not with individuals, but with managing
subpopulations considered dangerous or risky.
Feeley and Simon demonstrate the managerialism and actuarialism
of the new penology operating in several aspects of crime control. Law
enforcement targets “high-risk” subjects,87 and arrests suspects deªned
by “racial proªles.” Prisons no longer rehabilitate offenders through
therapeutic, academic, and vocational programs, but incapacitate them
based on risk classiªcation.88 High rates of recidivism no longer demon-
strate failure of the parole system’s ability to reintegrate offenders, but
rather success in efªciently restoring offenders to prisons that manage
the risk of their inevitable reoffending.89
The new penology’s focus is the maximization of social control
and efªciency of the criminal justice system. In Feeley and Simon’s
view, the new penology “manag[es] a permanently dangerous popula-
tion while maintaining the system at a minimum cost.”90 Through sur-
veillance, classiªcation, and containment, the system maintains con-
trol over speciªc populations that cannot be disaggregated from
society or transformed.91
Such fundamental transformations in the goals of criminal pun-
ishment have parallels in deportation law, the most “criminalized” sec-
                                                                                                                     
83 Feeley & Simon, supra note 63, at 450.
84 See id.
85 See id. at 450; Welch, supra note 80, at 74–75.
86 See Feeley & Simon, supra note 63, at 455. The new penology’s goal “is not to elimi-
nate crime but to make it tolerable through systemic coordination.” Id.
87 See id. at 459; Jonathan Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the New Pe-
nology, 4 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 452, 453 (1998).
88 See Feeley & Simon, supra note 63, at 459. Indeed, Feeley and Simon describe a “cus-
todial continuum” from solitary conªnement units to military-style boot camps to elec-
tronic monitoring/house arrest that responds not to the particular needs of individual
offenders, but to the degree of risk posed by groups of offenders (and thus the degree of
control warranted to respond to the risk). Id.
89 See id. at 456.
90 Id. at 463.
91 See id.
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tor of immigration law.92 Consistent with the criminal justice system’s
abandonment of individualized treatment and rehabilitation for crimi-
nal offenders, and its simultaneous embrace of an actuarial approach
that simply manages high-risk groups, the immigration system attains
social control through the mass expulsion of undesirable non-U.S. citi-
zens, while largely ignoring the signiªcance of individualized, mitigat-
ing factors.93 For the small percentage of deportable aliens the United
States cannot expel, social control is exercised through indeªnite de-
tention or warehousing.94
In the 1980s and 1990s, undocumented aliens were deemed un-
desirable, perceived as either taking scarce jobs away from Americans
or adhering to the welfare magnet.95 Criminal aliens, in turn, were
undesirable for their criminal, often drug-related, conduct.96 Immi-
gration reforms have sought to expel both groups of deportable ali-
ens retroactively and to contain individuals in immigration prisons
and local jails to minimize the likelihood of evading deportation, all
while drastically limiting avenues of relief.97
Criminal aliens are particularly vulnerable to new social controls
within immigration law. Prior to the immigration reforms of 1996, a
criminal alien committing a single crime of moral turpitude was de-
                                                                                                                     
92 See Miller, supra note 12, at 639.
93 See discussion supra Part I.B.
94 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) con-
tained an implicit “reasonable time” limitation of six months, the application of which was
subject to federal court review). Although Zadvydas restricted the government’s authority
to hold immigration detainees indeªnitely, it did not overrule Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), which authorized the indeªnite detention of im-
migration detainees determined by Congress or the Executive to pose a threat to national
security. See id. at 694; see also Gavin M. Montague, Should Aliens Be Indeªnitely Detained Under
8 U.S.C. § 1231? Suspect Doctrines and Legal Fictions Come Under Renewed Scrutiny, 69 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 1439, 1444 (2001). See generally Michelle Carey, You Don’t Know If They’ll Let You
Out in One Day, One Year, or Ten Years. . . Indeªnite Detention of Immigrants After Zadvydas v.
Davis, 24 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 12 (2003); Christina DeConcini, Post September 11: Sea
Change in Attitudes and Approach by Government Toward Immigrants, 1390 PLI/Corp 109
(2003); Joshua W. Gardner, Halfway There: Zadvydas v. Davis Reins in Indeªnite Detentions,
But Leaves Much Unanswered, 36 Cornell Int’l L.J. 177 (2003); Susan Marx, Throwing Away
the Key: The Constitutionality of the Indeªnite Detention of Inadmissible Aliens, 35 Tex. Tech L.
Rev. 1250 (2004).
95 See Miller, supra note 12, at 650–51; see also Nora V. Demleitner, The Fallacy of Social
“Citizenship” or the Threat of Exclusion, 12 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 35, 45–46 (1997); Peter H.
Schuck, Alien Rumination, 105 Yale L.J. 1963, 1985 (1996) (reviewing Peter Brimelow,
Alien Nation: Common Sense About America’s Immigration Disaster (1995)).
96 Ellis M. Johnston, Once a Criminal, Always a Criminal?: Unconstitutional Presumptions for
Mandatory Detention of Criminal Aliens, 89 Geo. L.J. 2593, 2594 (2001).
97 See supra note 4.
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portable only if the crime was committed within ªve years of entry
and a sentence of one year or more of conªnement was actually im-
posed.98 This condition thus associated criminal propensities with
proximate cause: criminal offenses committed long after entry were
considered unlikely to result from criminal propensities developed in
a foreign country.99 In other words, an alien’s criminality would likely
manifest within ªve years of entry.100
                                                                                                                     
98 INA § 241(a)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000); Ira Kurzban, Kurzban’s Immigration
Law Sourcebook 49, 53 (8th ed. 2002). A crime of moral turpitude refers generally to:
[C]onduct which is inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the ac-
cepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in
general. Moral turpitude has been deªned as an act which is per se morally
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of moral turpitude.
Id. at 53 (citing Matter of Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 867, 868 (B.I.A. 1994), aff’d 72 F.3d 571,
(8th Cir. 1995)). However, noncitizens with multiple convictions for crimes of moral turpi-
tude (not arising out of the same criminal scheme) were always subject to deportation
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tence imposed. See INA § 241(a)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000); Pacheco v. INS, 546 F.2d
448, 452 (1st Cir. 1976); Nason v. INS, 394 F.2d 223, 227–28 (2d Cir. 1968); Jeronimo v.
Murff, 157 F. Supp 808, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
99 See INA § 241(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000); Susan Levine, On the Verge of Exile: For
Children Adopted From Abroad, Lawbreaking Brings Deportation, Wash. Post, Mar. 5, 2000, at
A1 (chronicling the deportation of Joao Herbert, a Brazilian child adopted by U.S. citi-
zens, deported for a drug conviction, and later killed in Brazilian gang violence). The
retroactive nature of deportation for aggravated felons after 1996 socially controls immi-
grant communities by expanding the screening of non-U.S. citizens for criminality from
admissibility determinations made at the border to interior deportation proceedings. See
Levine, supra. The old regime for criminal alien deportation focused on screening for
criminal propensities at the border, and excluding those aliens with past criminal convic-
tions or conduct. Under this regime, aliens admitted to the United States could be de-
ported if they were convicted of a single crime of moral turpitude within ªve years of entry
(where a sentence of one year or more is imposed). If a resident alien committed a crime
of moral turpitude six years after admission, he or she would not be deportable. One ex-
planation for this rule regime is that immigration ofªcials screened for criminal propensi-
ties at the border, permitting deportation on the basis of some post-entry criminal conduct
as a way of ensuring that criminal propensities acquired abroad, but not detected at the
border, can be caught soon after admission and addressed through deportation. After
1996, retroactive deportation of aggravated felons is permitted, without regard to when
the conviction occurs. See INA § 241(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000). Thus, long-term resi-
dent aliens who came to the United States at a young age are vulnerable to deportation
even though their convictions occurred ten or twenty years after admission. See Levine,
supra. The case of children adopted abroad and brought to the United States as infants
illustrates the disregard for where criminal propensities develop. Id.
100 Levine, supra note 99.
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Since 1996, however, the length of time between entry and offense
is irrelevant for most crimes.101 Moreover, crimes with no deportation
consequences prior to 1996 were suddenly and retroactively deportable
offenses.102 Conviction of a crime for which a sentence of one year or
more may be imposed is sufªcient to trigger deportation, and a lighter
sentence nonetheless triggers harsh immigration consequences.103
These measures reºect a broader transformation resulting largely
from changes in perceptions of noncitizens and the risk they present to
the U.S. economy, public safety, and—after September 11—homeland
security.104 Although noncitizens are being treated increasingly puni-
tively, the causal relationship between the severity revolution in crime
control and enhanced punitiveness within the deportation system re-
mains subtle. The new penology explains a great deal about this rela-
tionship, particularly in the post-9/11 context. First, the government’s
use of immigration law as a tool in the War on Terror is managerial.105
Despite great efforts to better secure U.S. borders, the likelihood that
foreign terrorists will enter the United States is still considerable.106 To
manage that risk, the DHS subjects a broad spectrum of noncitizens to
harsh immigration consequences that are often only indirectly related
to terrorist conduct.107
Second, the War on Terror is actuarial, relying upon statistical
predictions of risk.108 The apotheosis of this actuarialism is the terror
threat warning system that identiªes daily the risk of a terrorist at-
                                                                                                                     
101 See IIRIRA § 321, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000); see also Kurzban, supra note 98, at
158–59.
102 See IIRIRA § 321(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000). Under IIRAIRA § 321(b), the
effective date of the deªnition of aggravated felony is retroactive, covering all crimes
within the deªnition irrespective of the date of commission. Id.
103 See id. A light sentence may reºect mitigating circumstances surrounding the de-
fendant’s guilt. Furthermore, after 1996, a sentence refers to a time of incarceration or
conªnement ordered by a court, even if the time of conªnement is suspended or the execu-
tion is withheld. Kurzban, supra note 98, at 119–20.
104 See discussion supra Part I.
105 See Feeley & Simon, supra note 63, at 455.
106 See generally National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States,
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist At-
tacks upon the United States (2004). Efforts to better secure U.S. borders include more
aggressive law enforcement, greater documentation requirements, and technological innova-
tions such as the US-VISIT program, NSEERS, and new biometric technologies. DHS ofªcials
employ the aphorism “safer, but not safe” extensively to emphasize the need for continued
vigilance, while reassuring the public that security measures are justiªed.
107 See discussion supra Part I. Chief among these consequences is apprehension, ar-
rest, and conªnement in conditions of custody resembling criminal incarceration.
108 See Feeley & Simon, supra note 63, at 450 (discussing the use of probability in the
new penology).
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tack.109 Furthermore, immigration law enforcement relies heavily upon
religious and ethnic “proªles” of potential terrorists that are both un-
der- and over-inclusive. 110 Targeting Muslim and Middle Eastern men
of foreign nationality not only neglects Arab women and U.S. citizens,
but also affects adversely a range of immigrant communities, particu-
larly Mexican immigrants with brown skin and dark hair.111
Third, the War on Terror relies on surveillance, classiªcation, and
containment to maximize control over populations that can be neither
disaggregated from the United States nor transformed.112 Even before
9/11, immigration authorities surrendered the traditional goal of as-
similating all foreigners.113 The national insecurity fostered by the at-
tacks enhanced the perception that immigrants—particularly those
from Arab or Muslim countries—were inassimilable.114 Conceived of
not as individuals, but as aggregates of risk, these foreigners are moni-
tored, classiªed,115 and controlled through a variety of government ini-
tiatives.
Racial proªling and expanded reporting requirements exemplify
the new penology at work in the War on Terror. Racial proªling as-
sumes guilt or validates suspicion according to group-based character-
                                                                                                                     
109 See Department of Homeland Security Color-Coded Threat Level System, at www.dhs.
gov (last visited Nov. 22, 2004). The Color-Coded Threat Level System is prominent on the
DHS homepage and is an important component of the Homeland Security Advisory System.
See id. It has ªve color-coded warning levels to classify the degree of risk of a terrorist attack,
ranging from green or “low,” to blue or “guarded,” to yellow or “elevated,” to orange or
“high,” to red or “severe.” Id.
110 Michael J. Whidden, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and United States Antiterrorism
Legislation, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2825, 2861–62, 2872–74 (2001).
111 See Kevin R. Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants: Collateral Damage Comes
Home, 52 DePaul L. Rev. 849, 850–51 (2003) (examining the negative impact of the gov-
ernment’s response to the 9/11 attacks on the Mexican immigrant community in the
United States) [hereinafter Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants].
112 See Feeley & Simon, supra note 63, at 455.
113 David Simcox, U.S. Immigration in the 1980s: Reappraisals and Reform 3
(1988). The success of cultural movements of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s in favor of bilin-
gual education and multiculturalism contributed to the demise of the notion that the immi-
gration process transforms “foreigners” into true “Americans” through a melting pot process.
Miller, supra note 12, at 626 (referencing “compassion fatigue”).
114 Whidden, supra note 110, at 2865.
115 See Feeley & Simon, supra note 63, at 455. A good example of a risk classiªcation
system is the way the DHS has conducted the Alien Absconder Initiative. The DHS has
strictly enforced pre-9/11 deportation orders against an estimated 320,000 foreign nation-
als remaining in the United States, but has prioritized an estimated 6000 absconders on
the list from Arab and other Muslim countries. See Susan Sachs, U.S. Begins Crackdown On
Muslims Who Defy Orders to Leave Country, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 2002, at A13. Within this cate-
gory, the DHS focused ªrst on those estimated 1000 priority absconders with past criminal
convictions. Id.
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istics rather than individual culpability. Governmental reliance upon
statistical probabilities forms the core of racial proªling.116 Thus, the
racial proªling of Middle Eastern men since September 11 is both
managerial and actuarial, less about prevention than risk manage-
ment.117
Prior to September 11, racial proªling of African-American men
was publicly condemned at the highest levels of the federal govern-
ment.118 Even within immigration law enforcement, where noncitizen
targets of racial proªling lacked standing to challenge the practice,
race-based enforcement of immigration law was being questioned.119
Immediately after the attacks, however, racial proªling of individuals
of Arab and Muslim appearance commenced with a vengeance, enjoy-
ing wide public support and ofªcial sanction.120 Indeed close to two
full years after the attacks, the White House, in an unprecedented an-
nouncement, issued guidelines barring federal agents from using race
or ethnicity in routine investigations, but expressly exempted investi-
gations involving terrorism or national security.121
Similar efforts in the War on Terror have subjected noncitizens to
broad reporting requirements that increase their visibility to homeland
security and criminal law enforcement authorities. Based on immigra-
tion status and nationality, male visa holders from designated “al
Qaeda” countries were selected for scrutiny, a tactic that Karen Tumlin
has termed “immigration plus” proªling.122 In October of 2003, the
INS123 initiated the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System
                                                                                                                     
116 See Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants, supra note 111, at 868.
117 See Feeley & Simon, supra note 63, at 450–55.
118 Attorney General Seeks to End Racial Proªling, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 2001, at A20. Both
President George W. Bush and Attorney General John Ashcroft condemned the practice of
considering a person’s race or ethnicity in making trafªc stops and conducting criminal
investigations. Id. During his 2000 presidential campaign and later, in a “State of the Un-
ion-style” address in February 2001, President Bush condemned racial proªling, saying,
“It’s wrong, and we will end it in America.” Eric Lichtblau, Bush Issues Racial Proªling Ban
But Exempts Security Inquiries, N.Y. Times, June 18, 2003, at A1.
119 Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants, supra note 111, at 868.
120 See id. at 868–69, 69 n.22–26. Johnson cites a litany of articles and media reports
expressing support for racial proªling in investigating and combating terrorism. See id. at
869.
121 See Lichtblau, supra note 118.
122 Karen Tumlin, Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy is Reshaping Immigration Policy, 92
Cal. L. Rev. 1173, 1184 (2004).
123 The INS was subsumed by the DHS in March 2003.
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(NSEERS)—commonly referred to as “special registration”124—at all
ports of entry.125 Initially limited to male visa holders age sixteen and
over from mostly Arab and Muslim countries,126 special registration re-
quired non-immigrant visa holders to report to local district immigra-
tion ofªces to be photographed, ªngerprinted, and questioned under
oath, all under penalty of deportation.127 They were required to present
any requested documentation, including that of employment, their law-
ful admission to the United States, place of residence, title to land, or
lease and rental agreements.128 Before its phase-out in April of 2003,
and absorption into the comprehensive, biometrically-based U.S. VISIT
system,129 special registration procedures processed 60,822 non-
immigrants.130 The program effectively ºushed out thousands of non-
immigrants for technical immigration violations, but discovered few
terrorists.131
                                                                                                                     
124 67 Fed. Reg. 52,584 (Aug. 12, 2002); INS Publishes Final Rule on Special Registration,
Monitoring in Light of Ongoing Terrorism Concerns, 79 Interpreter Releases 1230, 1230
(Aug. 19, 2002).
125 See INS Publishes Final Rule on Special Registration, supra note 124, at 1230.
126 See Saudis, Pakistanis Added to Special Registration List, Armenians Deleted, Advocates Or-
ganize, 80 Interpreter Releases 2, 3 ( Jan. 6, 2003). Although the list of countries whose
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127 See INS Publishes Final Rule on Special Registration, supra note 124, at 1230. Non-
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128 Saudis, Pakistanis Added to Special Registration List, supra note 126, at 3.
129 See Special Registration to End, Be Replaced by Upcoming U.S. Visit Monitoring Program for
All Visitors, 80 Interpreter Releases 690, 690 (May 12, 2003) [hereinafter Special Registra-
tion to End]. At a National Press Club function in April 2003, Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity Tom Ridge remarked that the launch of the U.S. Visitor and Immigration Status Indi-
cation Technology System (US-VISIT) would provide DHS with “the crucial biometric
information needed to end the domestic registration of people from certain countries.” Id.
130 Maia Jachimowicz & Ramah McKay, “Special Registration” Program, Migration Infor-
mation Source, Migration Policy Institute ¶ 5 (Apr. 1, 2003), at http://www.migra
tioninformation.org/feature/display.cfm?=116. According to one authority on migration
trends, as of March 25, 2003, a total of 60,822 men had registered through special registra-
tion. Id. Some 2034 male foreign visitors have been detained temporarily through the Special
Registration Program for various violations of immigration law. Id. ¶ 8.
131 Rachel L. Swarns, Thousands of Arabs, Muslims Could Be Deported, Ofªcials Say, N.Y.
Times, June 7, 2003, at A1. Ironically, those who failed to register but were subject to re-
moval were not caught. Another example of enhanced reporting requirements rendering
noncitizens more visible is the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS)
through which educational institutions and exchange programs report and update infor-
mation regarding the enrollment status and progress of foreign and exchange students
2005] The Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control Post 9/11 105
The 8,000 men sought for voluntary interviews by DOJ ofªcials
were also chosen based on a combination of ethnicity, nationality, and
race.132 Shortly after the attacks, many Arab and Muslim noncitizens liv-
ing in the United States, with no known ties to terrorism were required
to report to law enforcement ofªcials for interviews related to terrorist
activities, simply by virtue of nationality or religious afªliation.133 The
voluntary interview process not only makes certain aliens more con-
spicuous, it simultaneously demonstrates how law enforcement ofªcials
target certain immigrant communities on the arbitrary bases of nation-
ality or religion rather than on actual knowledge of terrorism. Indeed,
the process has been criticized for spreading fear among immigrant
communities while producing few leads on terrorism.134
Taken together, these initiatives illustrate the government’s post-
9/11 homeland security strategy, speciªcally to cast a wide net for ter-
rorists using the regulatory discretion of immigration law enforce-
ment and harsh criminal law consequences to noncitizens to purge
society of noncitizens considered risks due to nationality, religion, or
race.135 Immigration law thus functions to detain vast numbers of
noncitizens until their potential dangerousness can be assessed.136
Furthermore, the narrow avenues of relief from detention and
deportation encourage those noncitizens caught in the counterter-
rorism dragnet to cooperate with homeland security ofªcials and, in
effect, to work for the department. The DHS’s use of the S-visa clearly
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The change of address requirement is yet another example of the War on Terror maximiz-
ing social control of immigrant communities through surveillance and greater visibility. See
discussion supra Part I. Out of the pool of special registrants, 13,434 were found to be out
of technical compliance with immigration regulations and consequently processed for
deportation.
132 Rebecca Carr & Tasgola K. Bruner, 3,000 Foreigners Sought for Terror Questioning, At-
lanta J. Const, Mar. 21, 2002, at A3.
133 See Registration and Monitoring of Certain Non-immigrants, 67 Fed. Reg. 40,581
( June 13, 2002). The rule became ªnal on August 12, 2002 and effective on September 11,
2002. 67 Fed. Reg. 52, 584 (Aug. 12, 2002).
134 See Encourage Cooperation Not Fear, Miami Herald, Sept. 15, 2002, at 4L. Even the ap-
proximately 6000 noncitizens chosen for removal as “priority” absconders under the Alien
Absconder Initiative were selected from a pool of some 320,000 individuals with ªnal orders
of deportation based on Middle Eastern heritage or Muslim religion. Leti Volpp, The Citizen
and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1575, 1579–80, 1580 n.12 (2002). Furthermore, the Bush
administration’s policy of automatically detaining asylum seekers from thirty-three Middle
Eastern and South Asian countries has been criticized as prejudging guilt on the basis of
country of origin. See Christopher Drew & Adam Liptak, Immigration Groups Fault Rule on
Automatic Detention of Some Asylum Seekers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 2003, at B15.
135 See Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented, supra note 1, 647–48.
136 See id. at 642, 648–49.
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illustrates this social control dynamic.137 S-visas have become increas-
ingly attractive to noncitizens in the strict, zero-tolerance immigration
law enforcement regime after 9/11, because they allow those aliens
cooperating with terror investigations and prosecutions to remain in
the United States.138 As criminal and immigration law scholar Nora
Demleitner notes, “[Such]immigration beneªts in exchange for co-
operation have become increasingly more valuable as the number of
deportable offenses has risen dramatically, and immigration judges
have been deprived of much of their discretion to avert [deporta-
tion].”139 Demleitner questions the wisdom of using immigration
beneªts in this manner, however, citing the grave potential for abuse:
Because of the high stakes involved, noncitizens are more eas-
ily coerced and may be more likely to provide doubtful and
unfounded information to law enforcement agencies to pro-
tect their tenuous status. . . . [T]he harshness [of immigration
law] and the limited venues for averting deportation make the
only alternative provided—cooperation—even more rife with
abuse.140
Signiªcantly, immigration law and policy—as it converges with
criminal law and punishment—has embraced the severity revolution
occurring in crime control over the past three decades, and its atten-
dant features of risk management, containment, and control.141 The
DHS’s social control mechanisms after 9/11—detention, racial
proªling, and harsh, zero-tolerance immigration law enforcement
with very narrow avenues of relief—raise the question whether these
initiatives improve or impede counterterrorism efforts. Zero-tolerance
law enforcement breeds fear of the government in communities best-
situated to investigate and report suspicious activity sponsored by Is-
lamic fundamentalists.142 Instead of cooperation, however, these poli-
cies also breed resentment in those communities that might otherwise
denounce terrorism.
                                                                                                                     
137 INA § 101(a)(15)(s), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(s) (2000); see also Kurzban, supra note
98, at 590 (explaining adjustment of S-1 and S-2 visa holders for family and spouse).
138 See Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement
Tools in the “War” on Terrorism?, 51 Emory L.J. 1059, 1074–75 (2002).
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1060.
141 See Feeley & Simon, supra note 63, at 457–58; see also Simon, supra note 6, at 220–22.
142 See Fareed Zakaria, Freedom vs. Security: Delicate Balance: The Case for ‘Smart Proªling’ as
a Weapon in the War on Terror, Newsweek, July 8, 2002, at 31.
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B. Deportation as Social Control
By casting for terrorists using every tool at its disposal—most no-
tably immigration and criminal law enforcement—and then selec-
tively detaining and deporting non-U.S. citizens for typically minor
immigration or criminal law violations, immigration law socially con-
trols immigrant communities through the deportation threat. Impos-
ing this threat, or that of detention pending deportation with no con-
sideration of individual merits, is a highly effective instrument of
social control.143 So effective, in fact, that signiªcant numbers of for-
eign nationals from Arab countries residing in the United States le-
gally and illegally—even lawful permanent residents on the track to
naturalization—have departed voluntarily rather than risk quasi-
criminal conªnement in an immigration detention facility or jail.144
A trilogy of articles by Professor Daniel Kanstroom investigates
the use of deportation as a means of social control.145 Kanstroom pos-
its that deportation is a vehicle of social control when disconnected
from the traditional rationalities of immigration law—speciªcally, the
conception of deportation as a “civil,” regulatory, contractual process
by which noncitizens who violate a condition of entry are “returned”
outside the territorial limits of the United States.146 Kanstroom em-
phasizes that deportation is used to “cleanse” society of its least desir-
able members, including criminal and illegal aliens, noting that the
United States is simultaneously admitting and expelling more nonciti-
zens than ever before.147 Thus, deportation’s rigid application to long-
term permanent residents nearly amounts to criminal punishment,
but lacks the constitutional protections afforded U.S. citizens who are
criminally tried or punished.148
An immigration clinician and scholar, Kanstroom has chronicled
the social control dynamic as it has developed within immigration law
over centuries.149 As an advocate for immigrants, Kanstroom describes
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144 Merle English, Pakistanis Flee INS Registry, Newsday, Jan. 10, 2003, at A29 (“Fear of
being detained and deported is driving some Pakistani nationals to ºee the United States
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145 See generally Kanstroom, Crying Wolf or Dying Canary?, supra note 74; Kanstroom, De-
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Constitutional Dialogue, supra note 34, at 771.
146 See Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment, supra note 8, at 1897–98.
147 See id. at 1891–92.
148 See id. at 1894.
149 See, e.g., id. at 1891.
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the increasing prevalence of crime control to justify increasingly harsh
deportation laws, identiªes “the ascendancy of the crime control
justiªcation” within deportation law as a “rather complete conver-
gence,” and criticizes the use of criminal punishment within the civil,
regulatory system of immigration control as constitutionally illegiti-
mate, if perhaps efªcient.150 In commenting on the efªciency of de-
portation in crime control, Kanstroom indirectly acknowledges the
social control apparatus of the new penology at work in immigration
reforms targeting the post-entry criminal conduct of noncitizens, par-
ticularly long-term permanent residents.151
That deportation and criminal punishment function jointly to ex-
ercise social control is pertinent to U.S. counterterrorism after Sep-
tember 11 in several respects. It is relevant because the government
used immigration laws to pursue their criminal investigation of the at-
tacks. Nearly 1,200 men of Arab or Middle Eastern descent were ar-
rested, detained, investigated and interrogated in immigration prisons,
private detention facilities, and county jails across the country.152 Some
were arrested as terrorism suspects pursuant to the PENTTBOM inves-
tigation, while others were picked up through tips or other leads in the
FBI investigation.153 Little attempt was made to distinguish between
immigration and criminal detainees.154 Justice Department ofªcials,
aware of the constitutional protections that apply to individuals crimi-
nally apprehended, regardless of citizenship status, chose to arrest and
detain foreign men of Middle Eastern descent on immigration viola-
tions, thereby evading the greater level of due process guaranteed to
criminal arrestees.155
Moreover, the government’s response to September 11 derailed
attempts to ameliorate the consequences of this joint social control;
the zero-tolerance regime for minor immigration offenders gained
renewed strength. Before the attacks, noncitizens were subject to
                                                                                                                     
150 See id. at 1891–92, 1921–26.
151 See Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment, supra note 8, at 1891–92,
1921–26. The notion of efªciency reºects Feeley and Simon’s actuarial analysis of crime
control. See generally Feeley & Simon, supra note 63.
152 Mark Dow, American Gulag: Inside U.S. Immigration Prisons 25–26 (2004).
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harsh immigration consequences—most notably, deportation—for a
ever-increasing number of minor criminal transgressions.156 As a pen-
alty, deportation was criticized as vastly disproportionate given the ex-
pansive scope of deportation-triggering offenses. After the attacks, any
deviation from full compliance with the letter of the law became
viewed by criminal law enforcement ofªcers as suspicious.157
C. Detention as Social Control
Detention is another aspect of the hybrid crime/immigration
system of social control.158 Michael Welch’s scholarship on the ex-
panding detention industry within the immigration system documents
the government’s heavy reliance on incarceration and the economic
incentives for expanding this reliance.159 In the context of the War on
Terror, those incentives have only grown.
Astute observers have seen that the zero-tolerance law enforcement
policy of thirty years of the War on Drugs has increased criminal convic-
tions for less serious offenses, created demand for greater prison capac-
ity, and fueled a corrections industry whose economic imperatives, in
turn, accentuated such net-widening tendencies.160 Michael Welch
draws upon this history, the organizational links between immigration
and crime control, and the new penology in describing an “economic-
punishment nexus” operating within immigration law enforcement.161
Welch asserts that the INS (now the DHS) does not merely imitate the
criminal justice system, but responds to market forces that legitimate
and elevate the zero-tolerance approach to immigration control, to op-
erate under the same social control canopy.162 Simply stated, he claims
that immigration authorities are responding to economic cues from the
corrections industry.163 Although his analysis was generated prior to the
attacks and pertains primarily to immigration policies developed to ªght
the War on Drugs, Welch’s observation that zero-tolerance immigration
law enforcement—a hallmark of the War on Terror—fuels an industry
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that inºuences immigration policy, highlights a fairly overlooked aspect
of the social control of non-U.S. citizens in this Age of Terror: the com-
modiªcation of high-risk aliens.164
The temporal relationship between the Wars on Drugs and Terror
is important in understanding the more entrepreneurial aspects of
post-9/11 detention policies. The War on Terror was declared on the
heels of the War on Drugs.165 The timing is signiªcant for two reasons.
Despite assurances from INS ofªcials immediately after the attacks that
raids and roundups reminiscent of those during World War II would
not occur,166 the punitive immigration laws already in place provided a
ready and extensive detention infrastructure.167 Furthermore, the
counterterrorism measures taken after 9/11 through immigration law
enforcement were implemented when the criminal incarceration rate
had begun to slow for the ªrst time after nearly twenty years.168 Due to
vacancies, states such as Wisconsin and Colorado had begun to recall
prisoners they eagerly exported just a few years earlier,169 while other
states failed to renew contracts with private prison companies with
whom they were now in competition. Strapped for contracts, private
prisons turned to the ºourishing federal prison system for business.170
In 2002, record low increases in overall prison population were offset
by tremendous growth in the federal prison population.171 This growth
initially resulted from the crackdown on illegal immigrants and crimi-
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165 See generally Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug Prohibition Politics and Re-
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July 31, 2002, at A12.
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nal aliens preceding the 9/11 attacks. Continued growth results largely
from the detention of illegal and criminal immigrants nabbed in coun-
terterrorism’s heightened enforcement of immigration law.172 Indeed,
the relationship between heightened immigration law enforcement
and the failing private prison industry after September 11 has been
characterized as a “bailout.”173 For example, in May 2002, the Correc-
tions Corporation of America (CCA) won a three-year contract worth
$109 million to house federal immigration detainees in an empty CCA
prison in Georgia.174
The Absconder Apprehension Initiative typiªes the economic
boost to private prisons produced by counterterrorism after 9/11.175
Seeking to deport within ªve years an estimated 400,000 noncitizens
ordered deported but still present, in December 2003, the DHS un-
dertook an 8,000 bed expansion of its detention capacity, bringing the
number of beds up to 30,000.176 Private prison ªrms Wackenhut and
Corrections Corporation of America were both awarded contracts to
meet the demand.177 And although beyond the scope of this Article, it
is important to note the leading role of private prison companies in
detaining immigrants, including terror suspects, abroad.178
                                                                                                                     
172 For an informative and detailed explanation of the conditions that led to the gov-
ernment’s heavy reliance upon the private sector for the housing of immigration detain-
ees, see Joseph Summerill, Reforming Prison Contracting: An examination of Federal Private
Prison Contracts, 64 Corrections Today 100 (Dec. 1, 2002).
173 See Liberating the Voices: Fighting Immigrant Prisons in the Southwest, Border Action Net-
work, at 1 (2003) (“With the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Border Security Bill and
other counterterrorism measures in 2002, . . . one industry in particular, the private prison
industry, was gearing up to fulªll the newest demand: incarceration of immigrants.”), available
at http://www.borderaction.org/PDFs/BAN-Immigrant%20Prison%20Report.pdf; see also
Federal Bail Out for Private Prison Industry Continues, 59 Prison Privatisation Rep. Int’l ¶ 1
(Dec. 2003), at http://www.psiru.org/justice/ppri59.htm#United States.
174 OCSEA Members Protest Private Prison Bailout: Groups Plan to Hold Federal Government,
Lehman Brothers Accountable, Ohio Civil Service Employees Association (OCSEA) ¶ 7 (May
17, 2002), at http://www.ocsea.org/drc_051702.html. Correctional ofªcers’ unions have
been particularly outraged about the role of private ªrms in the rapidly growing federal
immigration detention market. See id.
175 See Eggen, supra note 28.
176 See Bruce Finley, U.S. Expanding Prisons to Detain More Immigrants, Houston Chron.,
Dec. 7, 2003, at A3.
177 See id. So-called “proªteering” on the shirttails of the rapidly expanding federal
immigration detention industry is not limited to the private sector. Many county and mu-
nicipalities across the United States are vying for contracts with the Department of Home-
land Security to house its burgeoning detainee population.
178 See Tim Lemke, U.S. Firm Pioneers Prisons Industry with Global Reach: Wackenhut Runs
36 U.S. Facilities and 19 Overseas, Wash. Times, Feb. 25, 2002, at A1. Recent revelations of
torture and sexual abuse of prisoners held in the Abu Ghraib facility in Iraq underscore
links between private prison entrepreneurs in the United States and the operation of mili-
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In sum, scholars of both criminal punishment and immigration
have discerned elements of social control that are present in post-
September 11th counterterrorism policies. The managerialism that
Feeley and Simon discern in a criminal justice system that is no longer
founded upon transformation and individualized justice is embedded
in counterterrorism policies that manage the risk of further attacks
through the proªling and identiªcation of “risky” foreigners, zero tol-
erance law enforcement and heavy reliance upon detention.
Kanstroom identiªes the intensiªcation of immigration screening in
the interior of the United States, far from the border (to which depor-
tation was traditionally linked) as a prominent element of social control
within post-September 11th immigration policy. Finally, Welch detects
social control in the “economic-punishment” nexus fueling the immi-
gration detention industry.
III. Blurring Distinctions Between Illegal Aliens, Criminal
Aliens, and Terrorists
The emphasis on apprehending, detaining, and removing non-
U.S. citizens deportable because of past criminal conduct has blurred
traditional distinctions between categories of deportable aliens. Al-
though much legislation passed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks
increases information-sharing among government agencies, creates
new grounds for refusing admission to aliens, and increases the sur-
veillance and tracking of visa holders and other visitors, much atten-
tion has focused on removing foreigners who are undesirable for a
wide variety of reasons. The broad objective of strengthening national
security has justiªed the detention and removal of illegal aliens,
criminal aliens, and even asylum seekers, despite the absence of a
clear nexus between these aliens and terrorism. That counterter-
rorism now encompasses so many broad and divergent crime control
and social welfare reform agendas suggests that purging the country
                                                                                                                     
tary facilities for the detention of terror suspects in Iraq, including the employment of
American private prison entrepreneurs as consultants on military prison operations and
members of Justice Department’s Iraqi “criminal justice reconstruction team”. Sasha
Abramsky, Incarceration, Inc: Private Prisons Thrive on Cheap Labor and the Hunger of Job-Starved
Towns, 279 Nation 22, 23 ( July 19, 2004) (“Abu Ghraib was controlled in the early days by
one Lane McCotter; to spend time in Iraq, McCotter, who returned to the United States in
September, took a leave of absence from his job as director of business development for
corrections at Management and Training Corporation, a Centerville, Utah-based private
prison company that hired him after he resigned as head of Utah’s department of correc-
tions . . . .”); Iraq: More Cashing In, 58 Prison Privatisation Rep. Int’l ¶ 66 (Oct. 2003),
at http://www.psiru.org/justice/PPRI58.asp#IRAQ.
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of unwanted convicts and impoverished, low-wage workers is more
achievable and more demonstrably successful than capturing Osama
bin Laden, discovering weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, or pre-
venting future terrorist attacks.
If traditional legal categories and the lines drawn between them
presumably distinguish clearly between categories of aliens for the pur-
pose of combating terrorism, the criminal/civil line and the citi-
zen/noncitizen line have achieved this goal only in the most superªcial
sense. Criminal aliens (deportable for their post-entry criminal con-
duct), illegal aliens (deportable for their surreptitious crossing of the
U.S. border), and terrorists (deportable for the grave risk they pose to
national security) are all deemed dangerous foreigners for whom
criminally punitive treatment and removal are uniformly appropriate
and urgently necessary.
A. Governing Through Terror? Criminal and Illegal Aliens in the War on Terror
Jonathan Simon coined the phrase “governing through crime” to
describe the process by which advanced industrial societies like the
United States have prioritized crime and punishment to guide and di-
rect the actions of others or, expressed differently, for “governing.”179
Simon rejects the notion that the United States is experiencing a crime
“crisis,” suggesting instead that the crisis is one of governance, both at a
formal/public/political level (e.g., electoral campaigns and political
rhetoric) as well as an informal/private/social level (e.g., schools and
family life).180 Simon suggests that this crisis of governance was precipi-
tated not by an increase in crime, but by the failure of traditional insti-
tutions of governance, such as the social liberal welfare state and a
prosperous industrial economy, to regulate the conduct of urban youth,
                                                                                                                     
179 Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime, in The Crime Conundrum: Essays on
Criminal Justice 174 (Lawrence Friedman & George Fisher eds., 1997).
180 Id. Jonathan Simon asserts that:
It has been obvious for some time that crime was casting a disproportionate
shadow over what we primarily identify with governance, i.e., politicians and
the electoral process of democracy. . . . Less obvious are the ways in which
crime has become a linchpin of governance within the less celebrated but
more primary settings of governance. In schools, prevention of crime and
drug use has arguably been the most signiªcant agenda item for the last two
decades.
Id.
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contain the mentally ill, depress the contraband drug market, and oth-
erwise provide social and economic security.181
Many of the reforms enacted after 9/11 challenge us to consider
the extent to which counterterrorism has become an organizing strat-
egy for a nation in crisis or has, at least, exacerbated the insecurity
that crime control-centered governance was intended to alleviate
through superior risk management. On the one hand, because the
impact—indeed, the central purpose—of terrorism is the creation of
extreme insecurity, the 9/11 attacks appear to have reinforced the
primacy of harsh criminal punitiveness and aggressive law enforce-
ment toward noncitizens as tools of governance. This is consistent
with the criminalization of asylum seekers, zero-tolerance of a broad
spectrum of immigration violations mostly unrelated to terrorism, the
heavy utilization of immigration detention, and other forms of cus-
tody discussed above. It also explains the aggressive deportation of
noncitizens with criminal backgrounds through DHS initiatives such
as Operation Predator and the Alien Absconder Initiative.
On the other hand, several trends suggest that terrorism—per
ceived as a hypercrime justifying the most repressive interventions, in-
cluding the sacriªce of noncitizens’ civil rights and civil liberties—has
the potential to become a new avenue for governance. Previously, the
punishment of crime seemed to be subsuming the priorities of other
systems of social regulation like immigration, juvenile justice, education,
and child welfare.182 Now the prevention of terrorism and the strength-
ening of national security are setting the priorities for the immigration
and prison systems. Like ªghting crime, counterterrorism has become
an all-encompassing goal, with which other systems of regulations are
realigning themselves. After 9/11, this realignment is evident both
structurally and substantively. On a structural level, the DHS, charged
with defending the United States against terrorism, subsumed the im-
migration system when a large portion of the federal government was
reorganized under the Homeland Security Act of 2002.183
In the twenty years before the attacks, crime control monopolized
social services systems such as the juvenile justice system, the child wel-
fare system, and the deportation system.184 Since the attacks, however,
counterterrorism has caused or justiªed many reforms and policy re-
                                                                                                                     
181 Id. at 176–77.
182 See Simon, supra note 6, at 246.
183 HSA, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (codiªed as amended in scattered
sections of U.S.C.).
184 See Simon, supra note 6, at 217, 246.
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versals within the immigration and criminal justice systems.185 Once
excused on the basis of necessity, document fraud by asylum seekers is
referred to federal prosecutors for criminal prosecution. And matters
of religious practice in U.S. prisons—arguably the most constitutionally
protected freedom in prison after decades of judicial assault on pris-
oner rights—are scrutinized through the lens of counterterrorism. Af-
ter 9/11, many Muslim religious leaders, or imams, ministering in New
York State prisons were targeted for expulsion for adhering to an Is-
lamic sect characterized as extreme and anti-American.186
The War on Terror has a pronounced crime control agenda for
several reasons. From the outset, the White House treated terrorist at-
tacks—the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 2000 bomb-
ing of the U.S.S. Cole, and the 1998 bombing of two U.S. Embassies in
East Africa—as criminal matters, rather than acts of war, in efforts to
“depoliticize” and “delegitimate” the acts.187 Moreover, after the 2001
attacks, the White House emphasized the linkages between drug
trafªcking and terrorism in a campaign against narco-terrorism. The
White House Ofªce of National Drug Control Policy ofªcially stepped
into the War on Terror on February 3, 2002, when two of its commer-
cials, aired during Super Bowl XXXVI, appeared during the game’s
broadcast.188 Although the White House’s narco-terrorism campaign has
since been repealed, the USA PATRIOT Act casts law enforcement re-
sources in the direction of ªnancial crimes, including drug money
laundering, in support of terrorist activities.189
Finally, crime control has been incorporated into the mission of
the DHS. The mission of the DHS is deªned statutorily as preventing
                                                                                                                     
185 See Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented, supra note 1, at 641–42. See generally
Lichtblau, supra note 118 (discussing racial proªling policies before and after 9/11).
186 See Thomas Frank, Schumer Takes On Saudi State Religion: Wahhabi Stance Draws Criti-
cism, Newsday, Aug. 13, 2003, at A12; Dan Mihalopoulos, U.S. Probes Jail Ministry for Mus-
lims: Critics Say Some Chaplains Spread Extremist Views, Chi. Trib., Aug. 10, 2003, at A1.
187 Gary Dempsey, Crime or Act of War?, Cato Inst. ¶¶ 2–3 (Sept. 25, 2001), at http://
www.cato.org/current/terrorism/pubs/dempsey-010925.html.
188 See Frank Ahrens, New Pitch in Anti-Drug Ads: Anti-Terrorism, Wash. Post, Feb. 4,
2002, at A3. The two Super Bowl ads cost nearly $3.5 million to run. Id. They claimed that
money to purchase drugs likely ends up in the hands of terrorists and narco-criminals. Id.
The ads kicked off a four-to-six-week nationwide campaign, which included ads on radio
and in 293 newspapers. Id.
189 See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act § 352, 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2003) (mandating that all
ªnancial institutions establish anti-money laundering programs). Title III of the PATRIOT
Act, the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of
2001, has been characterized as the most signiªcant U.S. anti-money laundering legislation
in thirty years. Robert G. Bagnall, Anti-Money Laundering, SJ095 ALI-ABA 222, 222 ( June
17-19, 2004).
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and responding to terrorism within the United States and reducing the
United States’ vulnerability to terrorism.190 This mission, however, has
had broad implications for crime control. The DHS has become in-
volved in a broad spectrum of criminal investigations and crime control
initiatives that were the traditional domain of criminal law enforce-
ment. For example, the Arizona Border Control Initiative (investigating
and combating human smuggling)191 and Operation Cornerstone (in-
vestigating and prosecuting money laundering crimes)192 bear clear
relations to immigration control or counterterrorism. Others, however,
employ the broad resources of homeland security to perform functions
more akin to police work. Through Operation Predator, for instance,
the DHS identiªes, prosecutes, and (in the case of noncitizens) deports
child pornographers, rescues children depicted in pornography, and
assists in the prosecution of child pornography distributors.193
The War on Terror is, furthermore, the primary justiªcation for
the proposed Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal
(CLEAR) Act.194 The CLEAR Act blurs distinctions between illegal ali-
ens, criminal aliens, and terrorists by giving state and local law en-
forcement ofªcers the authority to arrest and detain criminal and ille-
gal aliens in the normal course of their duties, and requires that the
names of individuals violating civil immigration orders be added to the
National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) database accessible
from patrol cars.195 The bill’s original sponsor, Representative Charlie
Norwood, has characterized the proposed legislation as a signiªcant
step toward combating America’s criminal alien crisis and apprehend-
ing dangerous potential terrorists.196
                                                                                                                     
190 HSA § 101, 116 Stat. 2135, 6 U.S.C. § 111 (2003).
191 Asa Hutchinson, Congressional Testimony, DHS Fact Sheet: Arizona Border Control
Initiative, (June 17, 2004), available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=43&con
tent=3356.
192 Press Release, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Press Release, Secretary
Ridge Announces New Financial Investigations Initiatives: Unveils Comprehensive New
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193 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: Operation Predator ( July 9,
2003), available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=43&contentU.S.=1067&
print=true.
194 See H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2004).
195 House Subcommittee Debates Local Law Enforcement of Immigration Laws under Proposed
CLEAR Act, 80 Interpreter Releases 1407, 1407 (2003); Michael J. Wishnie, State and
Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1084, 1086-87 (2004).
196 News Release, CLEAR Act Hits 125 (Oct. 13, 2004), at http://www.house.gov/
apps/list/press/ga09_norwood/CLEARAct125.html [hereinafter CLEAR Act Hits 125].
The proposed legislation has sparked nationwide controversy. Many local law enforcement
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In addition to its crime control functions, the War on Terror ra-
tionalizes the governance of noncitizens in other contexts. As the case
of one refugee illustrates, even a tenuous connection to the War on
Terror can justify the punitive treatment of immigrants with no crimi-
nal history. David Joseph was neither a criminal nor a terrorist; he was a
Haitian refugee who sought asylum in the United States and ended up
in detention for nearly two years.197 Although both an immigration
judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals ruled that Joseph should
be released on bond pending a ªnal determination of his asylum peti-
tion, Attorney General John Ashcroft blocked his release, thus drasti-
cally expanding government detention authority.198 The grounds for
Ashcroft’s decision were completely unrelated to any danger Joseph
might pose as either a terrorist or a criminal. Instead, his intervention
was based on the belief that releasing Joseph would encourage a refu-
gee ºow from Haiti that might, in turn, jeopardize U.S. national secu-
rity, should terrorists from Pakistan or other Arab or Muslim countries
choose Haiti as a staging ground for inªltrating the United States un-
detected.199 Ultimately, Joseph was deported back to Haiti, just three
weeks shy of a full two years in detention.200
                                                                                                                     
agencies and communities have openly opposed the CLEAR Act because it contravenes a
long-standing tradition in many communities of separating crime control and immigration
control functions. For example, the City of Houston rejected local enforcement of immi-
gration law. See Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act of 2003 (CLEAR Act),
Hearing on H.R. 2671, 38 (Oct. 1, 2003) (statement of Gordon Quan, Member, City Coun-
cil, Houston, Texas), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/89636.PDF. New York
City Mayor Michael Bloomberg initiated a policy which prohibited law enforcement
ofªcers in his city from inquiring about a person’s immigration status, unless they are sus-
pected of a crime. See Maurize Pinzon, New York City Still Eager to Integrate Immigrants, N.Y.
News Network ¶¶ 23–25 (Oct. 17 2004), available at http://www.nynewsnetwork.com/Arti
cle.php?article=nyc+still+eager+to+integrate+immigrants.xml. As of October 13, 2004,
the CLEAR Act had 125 sponsors from both sides of the aisle. CLEAR Act Hits 125, supra.
197 Frank James, U.S. Expands Right to Detain; Ashcroft Invokes National Security, Chi.
Trib., Apr. 25, 2003, at 1; Rachel Swarns, Illegal Aliens Can be Held Indeªnitely, Ashcroft Says,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 2003 at A14 [hereinafter Swarns, Illegal Aliens Can be Held].
198 D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 573–74 (B.I.A. 2003).
199 See Bob Egelko, Many Illegals Can Be Jailed Indeªnitely: Ashcroft Rules That Granting
Bail Could Threaten National Security, S.F. Chron., Apr. 25, 2003, at A3. According to Ash-
croft: “In light of the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, there is increased necessity in pre-
venting undocumented aliens from entering the country without the screening of the
immigration inspections process.” Id.; see also Margaret Taylor, Dangerous by Decree: Detention
Without Bond in Immigration Proceedings, 9 Bender’s Immigration Bulletin 906, 915
(2004).
200 Alva James-Johnson, U.S. Deports Haitian Amid Anger, Fort Laud. Sun-Sentinel,
Dec. 1, 2004, at A29.
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Although harsh immigration legislation passed in 1996 gave At-
torney General Ashcroft broad authority to deny bond to noncitizens
in deportation and asylum proceedings with little judicial review, this
was the ªrst time he denied bond to an immigrant with no link to ter-
rorism by invoking broader security concerns.201 Attorney General
Ashcroft not only directed immigration judges to deny bond to all
Haitian boat people seeking asylum, but also directed immigration
judges to give credence to any executive branch assertions of
“signiªcant national security interests” in future bond proceedings.202
Notwithstanding the government’s actual knowledge that Joseph was
neither a criminal nor a terrorist, he refused to individually assess risk
in this case, preferring a blanket policy of denying bond to all Haitian
boat people by citing national security concerns.203 Factoring in the
historical reluctance of the United States to absorb refugees from
Haiti when refugees from other Caribbean countries—particularly
Cuba—have been greeted with open arms,204 counterterrorism as a
rationale for Joseph’s detention justiªes a governing policy that pun-
ishes Haitians who dare to seek refuge in the United States and sends
a message to those who might follow.
B. Advancing Homeland Security by Apprehending Criminal Aliens:
Homeland Security as Crime Control
In the War on Drugs, illegal aliens became criminal aliens. Crimi-
nal aliens became uniformly perceived as a threat to public safety. After
the attacks of September 11, public safety became national security.
And national security has become homeland security.
1. Illegal Aliens Became Criminal Aliens
Prior to the criminalization of immigration law under the War on
Drugs and welfare reform (and now under the War on Terror), illegal
immigration was commonly analyzed as a problem of labor regulation
rather than crime control.205 Illegal immigrants traditionally faced hos-
tility in border states where they placed greater demands on welfare
and other social beneªt systems.206 At a national level, however, the
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2005] The Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control Post 9/11 119
country was fairly sympathetic to the plight of Mexicans who crossed
the border illegally to work.207 They were perceived as poor but decent
people doing what was necessary to secure a brighter future for their
families.208 However, during the 1980s and 1990s, immigration restric-
tionists such as Peter Brimelow, Wayne Lutton, and John Taunton
worked to link the crime crisis that was transforming America’s urban
areas to the presence of illegal immigrants. Lutton and Taunton char-
acterized illegal aliens as inherently criminal. To them, “all illegal aliens
show at least some propensity for crime by the very presence, possible
only through the violation of at least one law.”209 As perceptions of ille-
gal immigrants shifted from undocumented workers to dangerous
criminals, illegal immigrants became equated with criminal aliens.
2. Criminal Aliens Became a Present Threat to Public Safety
Immigration reforms enacted in the late 1980s and 90s mandated
deportation and detention for most criminal aliens with few avenues
for relief from either deportation or detention based upon individual
equities. By eliminating traditional avenues of relief from deportation
and mandating the imprisonment of criminal aliens pending deporta-
tion, Congress mandated zero-tolerance of most categories of crimi-
nal aliens. Detained criminal aliens are now subject to disciplinary
treatment on par with those in criminal detention.210 To support
mandatory detention, the U.S. government cites its duty to protect
the public from the risk of future criminal activity by aliens.211 But by
                                                                                                                     
207 See Michael C. LeMay, From Open Door to Dutch Door: An Analysis of U.S.
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211 Department of Homeland Security Transition: Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforce-
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narrowly restricting individualized judicial inquiry into detention and
deportation circumstances—such as questions of rehabilitation, in-
centive (or lack thereof) to commit a crime—deportable criminal ali-
ens are uniformly assumed to be predisposed to re-offend, thereby
constituting a present threat to public safety.212
3. Public Safety Is National Security
The White House asserts that the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity was created with one single overriding responsibility: to make
America more secure by “unifying once-fragmented Federal functions
in a single agency dedicated to protecting America from terrorism.”213
Consolidating the law enforcement arm of immigration control, cus-
toms, border control, and other resources under the umbrella of the
DHS, both acknowledged the reality of the convergence of crime and
immigration control and created a situation in which traditional dis-
tinctions between crime and immigration control would be blurred in
advancing the War on Terror. ICE, the largest investigative arm of the
DHS’s Border and Transportation Security Directorate (BTS), employs
over 20,000 individuals.214 Homeland Security ofªcials openly acknowl-
edge that the job of deporting noncitizen criminal offenders is easier
when accomplished with the vast array of law enforcement resources
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available under the DHS.215 Ridding the country of foreign nationals
with criminal convictions and preventing terrorism has become a
uniªed, seamless enterprise: both criminal aliens and terrorists
threaten the security of the homeland. As ICE Acting Assistant Secre-
tary Michael J. Garcia stated, “As a new agency under the Department
of Homeland Security, ICE is committed to ensuring the safety of the
American public. Reducing the number of dangerous criminal aliens
hiding in this country is a crucial part of that mission.”216 That the War
on Terror has advanced the interdependence of the crime control and
immigration control systems is evident in the expansive scope of the
department’s mission.
The War on Terrorism has broadly recast the War on Drugs in a
light favorable to anti-terrorist initiatives through the rehabilitation and
defense of drug war legal enforcement procedures that have become
useful in combating terrorism. In United States v. Alvarez-Machain—re-
cently argued before the U.S. Supreme Court—the U.S. government
sought to rehabilitate law enforcement methods that the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit found to have constituted torts and violated
basic human rights, and therefore exposed the government to liabil-
ity.217 The Bush administration fought to overturn this holding and a
subsequent damages award against the government by arguing that the
case “has the potential to dramatically limit [the government’s] power
to ªght the war on terror.”218
The case emerged out of the U.S. government’s indictment of
Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican physician, for his alleged role
in the murder and torture of a U.S. drug enforcement agent in Mex-
ico. When Mexico refused to extradite the defendant, the U.S. gov-
ernment kidnapped him and brought him to the United States with
the aid of hired bounty hunters and a U.S. Mexican agent.219 The case
was tried in 1992, after the defendant had spent two years in pretrial
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detention.220 At the close of the prosecution’s case, the judge acquit-
ted Alvarez-Machain of all charges, ªnding the government’s case
founded in “wild speculation.”221 Alvarez-Machain returned to Mexico
a free man, and promptly sued both the United States under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act222 (claiming that DEA agents have no authority to
carry out arrests on foreign soil) and the Mexican agent of the United
States under the Alien Tort Statute223 (claiming that his arrest was ar-
bitrary and therefore violated international human rights law). The
United States appealed Alvarez-Machain’s Ninth Circuit victory and
modest $25,000 award. As the news media observed, “What started
out as a drug case for the U.S. government in 1990 . . . has been trans-
formed into a terrorism case in 2004.”224 In June 2004, the Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision,225 thereby insulating the
federal government from liability for exercising an arrest power likely
to be employed again within the context of counterterrorism.
Traditional distinctions between illegal aliens, criminal aliens and
terrorists have been blurred by counterterrorism policies that seek to
strengthen national security by embracing varied and broad crime
control and social welfare reform agendas, including drug control,
zero tolerance crime prevention and the purging of an illegal immi-
grant population perceived as undeserving and costly. The lumping
together of these varied categories of aliens, and removing them
based on their precarious citizenship status has not only reconªgured
the immigration system, but also altered the criminal justice system in
ways that will not be understood fully for many years.
Conclusion
The INA has been compared to the tax code in technicality and
complexity.226 Since the 1920s, the U.S. government employed non-
traditional approaches to controlling organized crime that included
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vigorous enforcement of tax laws.227 High-ranking Maªa leaders who
had insulated themselves so effectively as to evade prosecution for
criminal acts committed by their organizations, were nabbed by Treas-
ury ofªcials for violations of the federal tax code.228 These prosecutions
for tax evasion underscored the efªcacy of a primarily regulatory, ad-
ministrative legal apparatus to achieve signiªcant penological objec-
tives.229 Likewise, after September 11, immigration law functions as a
powerful adjunct to the criminal justice system in its pursuit not only of
terrorists, but of a host of objectives, including the apprehension, in-
carceration, and expulsion of undocumented workers and noncitizens
with criminal convictions, some of whom are long-term permanent
residents with remote criminal convictions. Clearly, the INA’s ability to
achieve similarly punitive outcomes among disparate immigrant popu-
lations makes it possible to argue that the United States is more secure
simply because more members of a population perceived as threaten-
ing have been apprehended, detained, and deported.
Should the success of counterterrorism measures be judged by
the number of noncitizens being incarcerated and deported? Does
the availability of narrow avenues of relief from harsh immigration
consequences for informants produce credible intelligence? To what
extent does the resurgence of racial proªling in immigration law en-
forcement merely reinforce harmful stereotypes with no clear added
security beneªt? To what extent is the nation made more secure when
its alien population is subject to harsh, criminally punitive sanctions
for relatively minor criminal or immigration transgressions? These are
emergent questions whose contours have yet to be sharply deªned.
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